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     A long tradition in economic theory models economic policy decisions as solutions to 
optimization problems solved by rational and well-informed agents:
1 A single 
policymaker minimizes a loss function subject to some constraints. Another body of 
literature models policy decisions as if they were made by well-informed voters in 
elections of some sort.
2  
     As everyone knows, each of these approaches is allegorical in some respects—two of 
which are germane to this paper. First, apart from votes on school budgets and on some 
bond issues, economic (and other) policy decisions are rarely taken by direct democracy.  
We instead utilize representative democracy, in which elected politicians decide on our 
behalf. Second, in many cases, the agents making the decisions may neither be as well 
informed nor as rational as homo economicus.  Blendon et al. (1997), for example, find 
large gaps between measured economic performance and the public’s perception thereof.   
     Monetary policy decisionmaking may perhaps approximate the loss-function model. 
Decisions there are taken by a technocrat or by a committee of technocrats, many of 
whom think like (or actually are) economists.
3 But fiscal policy clearly is not made this 
way. Even if we model the President of the United States as minimizing a loss function, 
his recommendation is just the starting point of a long process of political horse trading. 
There may be 536 relevant loss functions rather than just one—and they will not all be 
the same. Similarly, a complex brew of politicians makes the major decisions in virtually 
all other areas of economic policy—such as labor laws, tax laws, environmental policy, 
and social insurance programs, to name just a few.
4 
                                                 
1 “Well informed” need not connote perfectly informed. A large literature, of course, deals with imperfect 
information. 
2 Black (1948) is an early reference on the median voter model. Downs (1957) extended the model to allow 
for political parties.  See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a modern treatment of political economy.   
3 On the difference between individual and group decisionmaking in monetary policy, see Blinder and 
Morgan (forthcoming). 
4 Why this is so is an interesting question that we do not deal with here. See Blinder (1997).   2
     Of course, the fact that the voting and loss-function models are allegorical does not 
necessarily make them misleading, when interpreted as “as if” hypotheses. But to make a 
judgment on the applicability of these models of decisionmaking, it seems worth digging 
down deeper into the actual processes that guide policymaking. This paper takes a step in 
that direction. 
     Specifically, we take it as axiomatic that (a) the political mechanism makes almost all 
important economic policy decisions, and (b) the decisions of elected politicians are 
heavily influenced by public opinion polls. These are hardly dazzling insights. Point (a) 
simply states a fact; it is also central to both standard approaches to the economic theory 
of policymaking: loss functions and voting. Point (b) is rarely discussed by economists in 
their scholarly work. But its importance is apparent from the tremendous resources that 
politicians devote to assessing public opinion, and there is plenty of supportive evidence 
in political science.
5 
      Legitimate doubts have been raised about whether the types of questions commonly 
asked in public opinion polls assess individuals’ true preferences.
6 That is not our 
question here because understanding the determinants of public opinion as expressed in 
standard polls remains important as long as these polls influence politicians’ policy 
decisions. This point remains valid irrespective of whether people understand the issues 
well or are confused about them, whether they are self-interested or public-spirited, and 
whether they are well-informed or poorly-informed.  
     If we accept these points, a host of interesting questions arise, two of which are the 
foci of this paper. First, to what extent is mass public opinion shaped by political 
ideology, self-interest, and—don’t laugh—economic knowledge? Second, to the extent 
that knowledge is relevant to opinions on issues, how do people inform themselves?   
                                                 
5 Among the many references that could be cited, see Page and Shapiro (1983) and Monroe (1979). 
6 See, for example, Kahneman (1986).   3
     This paper offers many detailed answers to these and related questions, so it may be 
useful to begin with a broad characterization that may help the reader see the forest 
amidst all the trees to follow. Subject to many caveats, we find that ideology is the most 
consistently important determinant of public opinion on a number of major economic 
policy issues, and objective measures of material self-interest are the least important.
7 
Knowledge about the economy ranks somewhere in between—sometimes it is important, 
but sometimes it is not. To us, this does not paint a picture in which homo economicus is 
in charge. 
     Our evidence comes from a unique, new telephone survey of a random sample of the 
U.S. population over age 18. The paper is organized as follows. We begin by setting up a 
recursive model of the formulation of public opinion. Next, we explain the survey that we 
designed and implemented, including some of the specific questions.
8 Two lengthy 
sections comprise most of the paper. The first discusses some of the more interesting 
tabulations and cross-tabulations of the data; these are the straight facts. The second 
presents estimates of our econometric model of public opinion. We conclude with some 
overarching, though admittedly speculative, interpretations of our findings. 
  
On The Determinants of Public Opinion 
     To formulate an estimable model of how public opinion on economic policy issues is 
formed, we work backward. To the extent that the process is rational at the individual 
level, a person’s position on an issue should depend on (a) her self interest, (b) her 
                                                 
7 Our findings are consistent with Citrin and Green’s (1990, pp. 16-17) survey of the political science 
literature, which concludes, “Taken as a group, the studies summarized above appear devastating for the 
claim that self-interest, defined narrowly as the pursuit of immediate material benefits, is the central motive 
underlying American public opinion. … When self-interest effects did appear, they generally were weaker 
than the influence of alternative sources of opinions such as values, feelings of group solidarity or 
ideology.”   
8 We do not include the survey instrument here because it is long (over 40 pages) and a bit hard to read 
owing to complexities in the skip pattern. It is available, along with additional descriptive statistics, under 
“Economic Issues Survey” on the website of the Princeton Survey Research Center at 
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~psrc/surveys.html.   4
ideology or “values”, (c) her factual knowledge and conceptual understanding of the 
issue, and (d) the degree to which she bases her decision on self interest versus her 
perception of what is in the public interest.
9 The last of these is likely the hardest to 
measure, even by asking people. Our basic model is: 
                (1)  OPi = f(SIi, IDi, Ki, EDi, Xi) + e1i, 
where OP=opinion of person i at the time of the survey, SI=self-interest, ID=ideology, 
K=knowledge, ED=education, X=a vector of “demographic” variables such as race, sex, 
age, and income, and e1i is an error term.
10 
     Our survey elicits some information about each respondent’s ideology and self 
interest. But we make no attempt to explain how any particular person’s values and 
ideology were formed, nor why his or her self interest is what it is. We simply treat these 
variables as econometrically exogenous. (For example, one of our “self interest” 
variables is income. We make no attempt to explain family income.) Our main focus is 
on the acquisition of information, where the survey probed much more deeply. 
      The amount and kind of knowledge a person has on any particular economic issue 
ought to depend on the costs and benefits of acquiring such knowledge. Our survey was 
thus designed not only to measure how well-informed respondents are, but also how and 
where they get their information. Thus: 
               (2)     Ki = g(EDi, Di, Si, Qi, Xi) + e2i, 
where D is a survey measure of how strongly the respondent desires to be informed about 
the economy and economic policy, S is a vector representing the sources of information 
that the individual uses, and Q is an indicator of the quantity or intensity of information. 
The specific definitions are explained in the next section. 
                                                 
9 See Zaller (1992) for an alternative, though related, framework of how individuals acquire and transform 
information into responses to public opinion questions that does not start by assuming rationality.    
10 There might well be lags in this process, but we have no time-series information.   5
     Finally, we try to explain why people do or do not choose to inform themselves, and 
in what ways: 
              (3)   Si = h1(EDi, Di, SIi, IDi, Xi) + e3i 
              (4)   Qi = h2(EDi, Di, SIi, IDi, Xi) + e4i 
              (5)   Di = h3(EDi, SIi, IDi, Xi) + e5i   
     So, and now working forward from “causes” to “effects,” our model is that people’s 
self-interest, ideology, education, and desire to be informed combine to determine how 
much information they acquire—and what kinds of information (equations 3-5). This 
information, along with their education and desire to be informed, determines their 
knowledge of an issue (equation 2). And this knowledge, along with their ideology and 
self interest, determines their opinions (equation 1). We pay closest attention to the first 
three equations: how people inform themselves, the determinants of knowledge, and the 
determinants of mass public opinion.           
 
The Survey 
     In the spring of 2003, we conducted a telephone survey of a random sample of the 
U.S. population over the age of 18, using random digit dialing.
11 As is typical for surveys 
of this type, the response rate (calculated according to the American Association of 
Public Opinion Research guidelines) was low—just 26% of working residential numbers.  
But, perhaps surprisingly, the available evidence does not suggest that such low response 
rates lead to major statistical biases.
12 In any case, we completed 1,002 interviews and 
then weighted the responses to match the March 2002 CPS population estimates in the 
                                                 
11 The survey was conducted by Princeton University’s Survey Research Center. The interviews began on 
March 28
th and ended on June 3
rd.  In the case of “no answers,” the survey protocols called for up to eight 
call-backs.   It has been suggested to us that mentioning Princeton University might have affected the 
response rates. But the sample did not look exceptional in terms of education, age, or other objective 
attributes.   
12 See, for example, Keeter et al. (2000).   6
following five respects: race, age, sex, education, and geographical region.
13 All the 
numbers reported in this paper reflect that weighting. 
     The survey, which typically took 12-17 minutes to administer, began with a series of 
questions about economic policy issues—some of which are factual and some of which 
solicit the respondent’s opinion. An example of the former is: 
•  Roughly what size (in billions of dollars) is this year’s federal budget deficit? 
 
An example of the latter is: 
 
•  Do you think the federal budget deficit ought to be reduced? 
The five policy issues we dealt with are taxes, the federal budget deficit, the minimum 
wage, Social Security, and health insurance. Each issue involves several questions. In 
some cases (detailed below), the ordering of the questions was randomized. But ordering 
rarely mattered. 
     After thus giving people an idea of the sort of economic policy issues in which we 
were interested, the survey went on to inquire about how they become informed about 
such issues. The transition question to that part of the survey was: 
•  Next, we’d like to know how important it is to you to keep well-informed about major 
economic policy issues, such as the ones we have just been discussing. Would you 
say it is extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not very 
important, or not important at all? (emphasis added) 
 
The answers to this question comprise the “desire to be informed” variable, Di in 
equations (3)-(5). Notice the deliberate framing of what we mean by “major economic 
policy issues.” 
     That initial question about the importance of information was followed by a series of 
inquiries into “the sources of information you use, either to learn about economic issues 
or to learn the opinions of others on these issues.” One prototypical example is: 
                                                 
13 Without weighting, females, senior citizens, the college educated, and non-Hispanic whites would all 
have been over-represented. The weights for each observation are derived from an iterative procedure that 
balances the five variables. So we do not match the CPS counts exactly.    7
•  Do you watch television regularly, occasionally, or not at all to learn about economic 
issues? 
 
Similar questions were asked for 10 other sources of information: radio, newspapers, 
magazines, books, statements by political leaders, statements by business leaders, 
statements by economists, statements by civic or religious leaders, discussions with 
friends and relatives, and the Internet (in that order). Most people presumably encounter 
statements by political leaders, business leaders, or economists via one of the standard 
media channels (e.g., television or newspapers). But, in our judgment, information from 
these three groups of “experts” was sufficiently different from the standard media fare 
(e.g., new reports) that they merited inclusion on their own. 
     The final section of the survey collected data on individual characteristics, including 
the usual demographic variables (race, age, sex, etc.), but also including less standard 
variables that relate to the five policy issues, such as income, whether the person reported 
voting in the 2000 election, whether or not the respondent was covered by health 
insurance, and whether the respondent’s parents were alive. 
    
Some Straight Facts 
     There are no well-accepted models of the phenomena we are studying, the directions 
of causation among the variables we have collected are not always obvious (and in some 
cases are clearly multi-directional), and we have a paucity of truly exogenous variables. 
(Race, sex, and age are the only unexceptionable ones.) So valid objections can surely be 
raised against any identifying assumptions we might propose in formulating a regression 
model—such as the recursive structure we impose. Undaunted, we will nonetheless do so 
when we estimate econometric models later. But before jumping into such controversial 
waters, we first provide an exploratory analysis of the data without imposing any 
structure on them.   8
   
The demand for economic information 
     We begin with the desire to be informed, the variable D in the model. Almost 24% of 
respondents said it was “extremely important” “to keep well-informed about major 
economic policy issues,” and just over 50% said it was “very important.” Another 23.5% 
characterized keeping well informed as “somewhat important,” leaving under 3% of the 
sample in the “not very important” or “not important at all” categories. Frankly, we were 
surprised—and pleased—by the strength of the expressed desire to be informed.
14 
     When we look across subgroups of the population, the answers to this question do not 
vary significantly (at the 5% level) by race, sex, education, or income. But older 
respondents expressed a slightly stronger desire to be well-informed. We also divided the 
sample into those who were working at the time of the survey (56% of the sample) and 
those who were not. The working population turned out to have a slightly weaker desire 
to be informed, compared to the heterogeneous non-working group, which includes the 
unemployed, retirees, homemakers, and students. 
     In a survey that inquires about information relevant to economic policy issues, we 
expected to find many systematic differences by political ideology. So respondents were 
asked to classify themselves as liberal (15% of our sample), conservative (29%), 
moderate (19%), other (4%), or “haven’t thought much about it” (33%). As a shorthand, 
we will refer to the latter group as the “non-politicals”. Notice that it is the largest group. 
Using all five categories in a χ
2 test of independence, we find little evidence of 
differences in the desire to be informed by ideology (χ
2 = 28.6, p= .133). 
                                                 
14 The interviewers’ script began: “Hi. My name is _____, and I’m calling from Princeton University to 
conduct a 15-minute survey about economics and access to economic information.” Given this preface, 
perhaps respondents believed they should express a desire to be informed. On the other hand, the question 
about desire to be informed came after a series of daunting questions on policy issues, which may have 
deflated some respondents’ beliefs about how well informed they actually were.   9
     However, we do find rather strong differences by a variable that might be called 
“political engagement” (rather than partisanship). Specifically, we asked respondents 
whether they voted in the 2000 presidential election. The answers to this question do not 
represent actual voting behavior accurately, since 68% of our respondents claim to have 
voted whereas the national data show that only 51% actually did.
15  They may instead 
indicate which respondents believe they should have voted (as well as those who actually 
voted). In any case, the self-described “voters” were considerably and significantly (χ
2= 
26.0, p= .001) more interested in keeping informed than were the non-voters. Fully 78% 
of “voters” said keeping well-informed was either extremely or very important to them, 
versus only 66% of nonvoters. This strong correlation supports our view that self-
professed voting is an indicator of political engagement. As further support of the notion 
that the so-called “non-politicals” are disengaged, we note that only 47% of them 
reported voting in 2000—versus 79% of everyone else. 
     Multiple regression estimates of equation (5) above were not very informative, 
however, and hence are not reported. We began by estimating an ordered probit model 
using the three regressors suggested by the simple correlations: age, working status, and 
whether the individual claims to have voted. Only the last of these was significant. We 
then experimented with a variety of demographic, ideology, and self-interest variables, as 
per equation (5), but found hardly any other significant regressors. In a word, our ability 
to predict a person’s desire to be informed based on measurable variables is negligible.  
     The next survey question asked each respondent who said that being informed was at 
least “somewhat important” to tell us “the main reasons why you wish to be well-
informed,” listing as choices the five reasons shown in Table 1. Just over half of our 
respondents gave the last response, which might be called “the civics class answer.” But, 
                                                 
15 See the Federal Election Commission data at www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/reg&to00.htm.  Our 
finding of over reporting of voting by 17 percentage points is in line with other surveys (see, for example, 
Erikson).     10
perhaps inconsistently, only 22% offered politics or voting as a reason. Slightly more 
than half mentioned the relevance of economic issues to their personal finances. But, in a 
big surprise to us, under 4% specifically mentioned the stock market as a reason for 
wanting to keep informed. Do these answers vary by personal characteristics? The only 
general answer is: somewhat. More specifically: 
     Demographics: Differences by age, sex, and race were generally minor. The only 
notable ones were that older people were slightly more likely to list the last response 
shown in Table 1 than younger people (59% versus 51%; p=.043),
16 and that men were 
more likely than women to list the idea that being informed might be politically important 
or affect their vote (by 26% versus 19%; p=.010). Because racial differences are so 
ubiquitous in cross-section work, we were surprised to find no significant racial 
differences in the professed reasons for desiring to be well-informed. 
     Economic status: Differences by education, employment status, and income were 
more notable. For example, college-educated people were substantially more likely than 
others to list three of the five reasons for wanting to be informed: the relevance of 
economic information for politics or their vote (by 35% versus 17%; p=.000), the 
relevance to their business or profession (by 10% versus 6%; p=.008), and personal 
finances (by 60% versus 51%; p=.018). Not surprisingly, employed people were much 
more likely (10% versus 3%, p=.000) to mention their job or profession as a reason for 
wanting to keep informed about the economy. And differences by income class were 
pervasive.
17 Compared to lower-income people, higher-income people were more likely 
to mention their personal finances (59% versus 48%, p=.005), their business or 
profession (10% versus 4%, p=.001), and the relevance to politics and voting (26% 
                                                 
16 Since the mean and median ages in our sample are both approximately 45, we divided our sample into 
“younger” and “older” subsamples at that age. 
17 For these χ
2 tests, we divided the sample at the $40,000 mark, which is close to the median; 45% of the 
sample reported a family income of $40,000 or less.  The next income bracket was $40,000-$60,000.     11
versus 18%, p=.025), but less likely to mention their general desire to be well-informed 
(50% versus 62%, p=.004). 
     Political involvement: Respondents of different political ideologies differed only in 
how often they mentioned politics or voting as a reason for keeping informed. However, 
this difference appears to be more a matter of detachment than ideology: Non-politicals 
were substantially less likely (8%) to cite politics than either liberals (27%), 
conservatives (28%), or moderates (31%). Across these four categories, the χ
2 test of 
independence is highly significant (χ
2 = 52.4). Consistent with this, self-described voters 
were much more likely than non-voters to cite politics or voting as a reason to keep 
informed (27% versus 12%, p=.000). 
  
The sources of economic information 
     The lengthiest part of the questionnaire inquired about the sources of information 
people use to inform themselves. As mentioned in the previous section, we asked 
specifically about the frequency of use of each of eleven possible sources of information 
about economic issues, and we coded the responses as either “regularly or often,” 
“occasionally,” or “rarely or never.” Table 2 ranks the eleven sources from the most 
frequently used (television) to the least (books). It is hardly surprising that television is 
the most popular source of information—by a substantial margin.  
     We followed this question by asking respondents whether they “learn more about 
economics from the networks, from cable, or about the same from both,” with the 
following results: 
Network stations               17% 
Cable stations                    28% 
About the same                 44% 
 
Although it reaches many fewer viewers, cable has a noticeable edge.   12
     It is also not surprising that newspapers rank second as a source of economic 
information. But we would not have predicted that more people get their economic 
information from local newspapers (54%) than from any of the six national newspapers 
(23%) listed in the survey or from any other “big city” newspaper (19%).
18 Remember, 
we pre-conditioned this response by first asking questions about national issues like the 
federal budget deficit and Social Security, not about the local school budget or personal 
finance. Finally, we inquired about which sections of the newspaper people “turn to, to 
learn about the economy or economic policy.” The business/financial (43%) and national 
news (39%) sections received the most votes, while the editorial page (including op-eds) 
lagged way behind (9%). 
     Once we peer below first and second place in Table 2, our priors on the rankings were 
pretty diffuse. “Discussions with friends and relatives” ranked third, narrowly edging out 
“statements by political leaders.” We were somewhat surprised to learn that radio is used 
so little, and we were quite surprised by the minimal use of magazines. (This includes the 
mass-circulation magazines like Time and Newsweek.) But we were gratified to find 
“statements by economists” ranking right in the middle of the eleven sources,
19 beating 
out the Internet, business leaders, civic or religious leaders, magazines, and books.
20 
Finally, it is worth noting that Table 2 probably underestimates the dominance of 
television since many people probably hear the views of political leaders, economists, 
and business leaders on television.
21 
     We concluded the section on sources of information by reading back to each 
respondent the lists of sources he or she had reported using “regularly or often” and then 
                                                 
18 The six national publications were: the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, USA 
Today, Financial Times, and Investors’ Business Daily.  Examples of “other big city newspapers” were the 
Boston Globe and the San Francisco Chronicle. 
19 About one-sixth of the people who said they learn about the economy from economists “regularly” or 
“occasionally” specifically mentioned Alan Greenspan as the economist. We did not prompt that response. 
20 Where the rankings of the distributions shown in Table 2 were ambiguous, we broke the tie by assigning 
point scores as follows: regularly=3, occasionally=2, rarely=1. 
21 Some of this information also comes from radio, magazines, the Internet, and newspapers, of course.   13
asking: “which… is your most important source of information on economics or 
economic policy.” By this alternative criterion, the rankings of sources are rather 
different (see Table 3). Television and newspapers still rank first and second, 
respectively; but the margin for TV is now enormous. After that, the rankings in Tables 3 
differ noticeably from those in Table 2, with, e.g., the Internet ranking much higher and, 
alas, economists ranking much lower.  Overall, the rank correlation between Tables 2 and 
3 is 0.76.      
In a word, television tops the list of how Americans get their economic 
information; everything else lags well behind. But not all people are alike. As we did 
with the reasons for desiring to be informed, we next looked for statistically significant 
(at the 5% level) differences in the frequency of use of the sources of information by 
demographics, economic status, and political engagement. There were many, so we 
summarize them briefly. 
    Demographics: χ
2 tests show that older respondents made significantly greater use of 
most, but not all, sources of information. But younger respondents used radio and the 
Internet more. Men reported making greater use of radio, business leaders, economists, 
and the Internet, while women reported greater use of civic or religious leaders. Racial 
differences were less common. Whites used TV more, while nonwhites used magazines, 
books, and civic and religious leaders more. 
     Economic status: We found significant differences in the usage of six of the eleven 
sources (radio, newspapers, magazines, business leaders, economists, and the Internet) by 
education. In each case, college-educated people reported using the information source 
more. Similarly, higher-income respondents made significantly greater use of six sources: 
newspapers, radio, the Internet, political leaders, business leaders, and economists. In 
only one case did lower-income people use an information source more intensely:   14
statements by civic or religious leaders. Differences by employment status were less 
common; non-employed people reported using books and the Internet more. 
       Political involvement: Although we found significant differences in information use 
by “ideology” in eight of the eleven cases, the differences did not typically cut across 
liberal/conservative lines. As a broad generalization, it was the non-political group that 
stood apart from the rest by making less use of information. Similarly, self-described 
voters were more likely to use eight of the eleven sources.  
  Although the types of media used by liberals and conservatives are similar, we do 
find ideological differences in the particular newspapers that individuals choose to read.  
Table 4 shows the proportion of people who obtain information about the economy from 
each of the major newspapers, classified by self-identified ideological affiliation.
22  
Liberals are a stunning eight times more likely than conservatives to read The New York 
Times, and conservatives are twice as likely as liberals to read The Wall Street Journal.  
But we do not find any ideological divide in the use of cable stations versus network 
TV.
23 
     Finally, for use as empirical counterparts to the theoretical variable Q (quantity of 
information) in equation (2), we constructed two measures of how intensively each 
respondent used the various sources of information. Remember, each person was asked 
how often he or she used each source. Let s1, s2, s3 be, respectively, the number of sources 
used “regularly or often”, “occasionally,” or “rarely or never”; and let the total number of 
sources, s, equal s1+s2+ s3. (Note that s can be less than eleven because of item 
nonresponse.) Then define QH (“quantity high”) and QL (“quantity low”) respectively as 
s1/s and s3/s. QH and QL thus measure intensity of information use and lack of intensity, 
                                                 
22 These numbers need not, and do not, mirror published circulation figures. For example, almost as many 
people report learning about the economy from The New York Times (8.2%) as from The Wall Street 
Journal (8.7%), even though the Journal’s (weekday) circulation is almost double that of the Times. 
23 See Hamilton (2004) for an analysis of trends in “media bias” and the impact of competition on partisan 
news reporting.     15
respectively.  Because not all sources of information convey equal information, our 
measures are undoubtedly crude proxies; but they are probably still correlated with the 
extent to which individuals access information about the economy.   
     The distributions of these two variables in the overall sample are shown in Table 5. 
Not surprisingly, the frequency distribution of QH (high intensity) is piled up at the low 
end: Fewer than 15% of respondents have a QH greater than 0.4, while 32% have QH 
below 0.1. Perhaps more surprisingly, the distribution of the variable QL (low intensity) is 
not piled up at the high end: Under 14% of respondents have QL  above 0.7 while 73% 
have QL between 0.2 and 0.7. 
     Looking across personal characteristics, we found some of the empirical regularities 
one might expect. College-educated people, high-income people, and self-professed 
voters reported significantly more intensive use of information sources. Compared to 
either liberals, conservatives, or moderates, the non-politicals had significantly lower QH 
and significantly higher QL. All these differences are significant well beyond the 0.1% 
level. The other personal characteristics—age, race, sex, and employment status—did not 
seem to matter much.
24 
Knowledge about economic issues 
     In the context of asking a series of questions about the five economic policy issues, we 
embedded nine “fact” questions whose purpose was to assess each respondent’s 
knowledge. The questions inquired about: 
1.  the share of income that a typical American family pays in taxes  
2.  whether most people pay more in payroll or income taxes 
3.  the size of the federal budget deficit 
4.  the level of the federal minimum wage 
5.  the size of the average Social Security benefit check 
6.  whether they knew that President Bush had proposed partial privatization of 
Social Security 
                                                 
24 There were two minor exceptions. Whites had slightly higher average values of QL than non-whites, and 
the employed had lower QL than the non-employed.   16
7.  whether they knew that the Social Security System is projected to start running 
deficits in about a decade 
8.  whether Medicare covered prescription drugs for outpatients (at the time of the 
survey) 
9.  the percentage of Americans who do not have health insurance. 
 
     We were surprised to find, as a broad generalization and with exceptions to be noted 
shortly, that the average responses to most of these questions were roughly correct 
(although the standard deviations were often huge). With one big exception—the federal 
budget deficit—there was also hardly any indication of skewness: Mean and median 
responses were close. Table 6 below compares the actual facts with the survey results. 
Several comments are in order.      
     The correct tax share is a difficult question conceptually. Most economists think first 
of taxes as a share of GDP, which was 28.4% in 2002. But the denominator of this ratio 
(GDP) is meaningless to most people, and the numerator includes many taxes that people 
probably do not think of themselves as paying.
25 So we posed a more user-friendly 
version of the question in the survey: 
•  About what percentage of the typical American family’s income do you think goes to 
paying taxes—including all levels of government? 
 
For the denominator of this ratio, we added the employee’s share of the payroll tax to 
personal income as defined in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). For 
the numerator, we included personal income taxes, estate and gift taxes, the employee’s 
share of the payroll tax, almost all sales and excise taxes, and property taxes on owner-
occupied housing—all from the NIPA. But we excluded corporate income taxes, the 
employer’s share of the payroll tax, property taxes on rental housing, customs duties, and 
the excise tax on diesel fuel on the grounds that individuals are unlikely to think of 
                                                 
25 Two prominent examples are the corporate income tax and the employer’s share of the payroll tax. This 
example illustrates a general and important point about public opinion polling. Economists often want to 
see survey questions that make sense to them. Such questions may involve complicated concepts and 
numerous provisos that leave ordinary people confused. Good poll questions need to be understandable by 
ordinary people with limited attention spans and no training in economics.   17
themselves as paying those taxes. The resulting tax share in calendar year 2001 was 
23.3%. Thus we were left with two alternative interpretations of the mean survey 
response of 31.3%: It was either a small overestimate of the tax share of GDP or a 
substantial overestimate of our constructed tax share. We favor the latter interpretation. 
Note also that the standard deviation across respondents was very large—more than 15 
percentage points. 
     About 83% of tax filers with wage income pay more in payroll taxes than they do in 
income taxes.
26 But our respondents thought the reverse was true, by a decisive margin of 
52% to 35%.
27 
     Estimates of the federal budget deficit—whether for fiscal year 2003 or 2004—were 
rising sharply while our survey was in the field. We therefore decided to count any 
number between $246 billion and $310 billion as correct; these were the official CBO 
estimates published on March 10, 2003 and May 9, 2003, respectively. In fact, the mean 
estimate in the survey ($334 billion) was amazingly accurate, especially since private-
sector estimates at the time were running well above CBO’s estimates. However, the 
variance across respondents was truly astounding—we received estimates of the federal 
budget deficit as low as $1 billion and as high as $5 trillion. The median response—just 
$90 billion—also showed that the “typical” response was far too low.
28   
     The average (and median) estimate of the federal minimum wage was also quite 
accurate, especially when you consider that some respondents may have given the higher 
state minimum wage instead.
29 
                                                 
26 See Gale and Rohaly (2003).  The 83% figure includes both the employer and employee components of 
the payroll tax.  If just the employee tax is used, then 53% of wage earners pay more in payroll taxes than 
income taxes.     
27 The remaining 13% did not know or thought they were about the same. Bartels (2003, p. 19) reports 
results from an NPR/Kaiser Foundation/Kennedy School survey that found that people are even more 
inaccurate in assessing whether they themselves pay more in income or payroll taxes. To us, this suggests 
that many people simply do not distinguish between income and payroll taxes.   
28 Nonresponse was also quite high on this question—about 48%, suggesting that there was even less 
knowledge than the reported estimates indicate.     18
     Average Social Security benefits were also estimated quite accurately in the survey, 
although the variance was again enormous and fully 18% of respondents were unable to 
answer the question. Similarly, majorities of respondents said they were aware “that 
President Bush has proposed that part of Social Security be replaced by personal 
investment accounts” and “that the Social Security system is projected to start running 
deficits about a decade from now.” In general, public knowledge of the Social Security 
system seemed pretty high. 
     Not so for health insurance, however. A bare majority (54%) realized that Medicare 
did not, at the time of the survey, cover prescription drugs “when people are not in the 
hospital”—despite an avalanche of recent public attention to the issue.
30 And perhaps the 
greatest misconception in the survey was the belief that a stunning 37% “of Americans do 
not have any health insurance today.” The actual number in 2002 was 15.2%. 
     Each of the nine “knowledge” questions above will be used in context later, when we 
study public opinion on specific policy issues. But we also constructed a generic 
knowledge score—the variable K in our model—as follows. Five of the questions 
(numbered 1, 3, 4, 5, and 9 in the list above) have numerical answers. For each of these 
questions, we computed the absolute error, and then assigned each respondent a 
percentile rank based on accuracy, Pij, where i indexes individuals and j indexes 
questions. We also assigned numerical scores to two qualitative questions (numbers 2 and 
8 in the list above), setting the values for the various answers so that the mean score was 
the 50
th percentile (just like the numerical questions) and the standard deviation 
approximated that of a uniform distribution (σ=28.9%). However, in computing our 
composite knowledge score, we gave only 50% weight to these two questions because it 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 Some respondents explicitly said that they reported estimates of their state minimum wage.  When we 
compute errors below, we use the state minimum wage as the true value if a respondent mentioned that he 
or she was reporting the state minimum wage. 
30 The 54-46 split excludes the 11% of respondents who did not answer the question.   19
was easier to guess the correct answer. We excluded the two Social Security questions 
that began “Are you aware that…” (numbers 6 and 7 in the list) on the grounds that the 
phrasing probably often “led the witness” to the correct answers. We then summed these 
ranks across all the (weighted) questions the respondent answered to obtain Ki  = (1/6) Σj 
Pij. Note that we always divide by six.
31  The knowledge measure thus treats unanswered 
questions exactly as they would be treated on an exam: They get zero points. Strikingly, 
the distribution of our constructed knowledge variable across the population of 
respondents closely resembles a normal distribution with a mean of 42.9 and a standard 
deviation of 16.7; see Figure 1. 
    How does economic knowledge, thus measured, vary by personal characteristics, by 
the desire to keep informed, by the main sources of information, and by the number of 
information sources an individual uses?   
     Personal characteristics: There were no significant differences in mean knowledge 
score by age, and only minor differences by sex and race.  Larger and more highly 
significant differences (all have p values below .001) emerged when we considered: 
•  Economic status: Higher-income people outscored lower-income people on our 
test by 8.6 points  (0.51σ). The scores of college-educated respondents averaged 
6.3 points (0.38σ) higher than the scores of non-college-educated respondents.  
This is far smaller than the gap of 0.9σ units recorded on the 1994 U.S. 
International Adult Literacy Survey; the difference is probably because our 
assessment is based on just seven questions, and is therefore noisy.
32   
•  Political involvement: Once again, the non-political group stood out from the rest 
with unusually low scores (about 6-7 points lower than liberals, conservatives or 
                                                 
31 About half the sample was not asked for their estimate of the budget deficit. For these people, we 
summed the (weighted) ranks and divided by five instead. 
32 As another point of comparison, Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2004) find that scores on the Armed 
Forces Qualifying Test rise by 0.17 standard deviation for each year of schooling.  The difference in years 
of schooling between college graduates and non-graduates is 4.5 years, so this amounts to a .77σ gap, or 
twice what we find for our test.     20
moderates), and self-reported voters scored 8.5 points higher, on average, than 
nonvoters.
33  
     Differences by desire to keep informed: It seems almost axiomatic that individuals 
who deem it more important to keep informed should actually be better informed. But 
the knowledge scores do not really bear this out, except for the lowest category (see 
Table 7). While the ordering is correct, the null hypothesis that all four means scores are 
equal cannot be rejected at the 5% level (p=.07). 
     Differences by major source of information: Table 8 shows that the small number of 
people who said that magazines are their primary source of information on economic 
issues (readers of The Economist?) were the most knowledgeable group (mean K score 
=52.7). The even smaller number of people whose most important source of information 
was statements by economists ranked second (mean K=50.3). The least knowledgeable 
people, by far, were the small group that relies most on statements by civic and religious 
leaders (mean K=35.0). Those whose most important source was television—a plurality 
of the sample—had a relatively low mean K score of 41.1. 
    Differences by quantity of information: Table 9 displays a positive, but by no means 
high correlation between the knowledge score and the number of different sources that 
the respondent reports using regularly. Thus, more information does improve knowledge, 
albeit very imperfectly. The null hypothesis that all the K scores are equal in Table 9 is 
rejected at beyond the 0.1% level, but the relationship is not monotonic.  
    Direction of Errors: Our test scores are based on absolute errors, without regard to 
sign. But it has been suggested that conservatives and liberals may make systematically 
different errors because the two groups seek out and utilize different sources of 
information in order to see their beliefs confirmed.
34 Although conservatives and liberals 
                                                 
33  This result is consistent with Palfrey and Poole’s (1987) results for political knowledge.   
34 See Mullainathan and Shleifer (2003).   21
had similar average percentile scores on the knowledge test, we did find some differences 
in the direction of their errors. 
     On average, conservatives thought that the federal budget deficit was much larger 
($333 billion vs. $177 billion), that Social Security benefits were a bit more generous 
($873 vs. $766 per month), and that a lower share of the U.S. population lacked health 
insurance (32% vs. 40%)—all as compared to liberals.  Conservatives were also more 
likely than liberals to report being aware that the Social Security trust fund is projected to 
run a deficit in about a decade (82% vs. 74%) and less likely to say that Medicare already 
provided coverage for prescription drugs (23% vs. 34%). While each of these differences 
is statistically significant, it is hard—for us at least—to see any clear pattern of 
ideologically-based bias in these numbers. And on the other policy questions—regarding 
the tax share, whether the payroll tax is larger than the income tax, the value of the 
minimum wage and whether respondents were aware of the Bush Social Security 
proposal—ideological differences were trivial and consistent with chance.   
 
Opinions on economic policy issues 
 
     As stated earlier, the survey instrument began with a series of questions about 
people’s opinions on a variety of economic policy issues. 
The Tax Burden and the Bush Tax Cuts 
     The first such question was: 
•  Do you think taxes in the United States are generally too high, too low, or about 
right? 
 
This question was asked, on a randomized basis, either before or after the fact question 
about the tax share. The ordering of the two questions turned out not to affect the 
responses appreciably, so we treated all the responses as a single sample. Some 61% of 
respondents said that taxes are too high, 36% said they are about right, 3% said they are 
too low, and 2% don’t know.   22
     The overwhelming popular sentiment that taxes are too high can hardly come as a 
shock to any sentient American. We have probably believed this since the 1770s. But the 
cross-tabulations by subsets of the population did hold some surprises. First, self-
described conservatives were no more likely than the population as a whole to say that 
taxes are too high. Liberals, however, were notably less likely—just 48%. The most anti-
tax group turned out to be those disengaged non-politicals (70% of whom said taxes are 
too high). Second, while racial differences were not terribly sharp, non-whites were more 
likely than whites to say that taxes are too high (p=.036). Third, lower-income people 
were more likely than higher-income people to say that taxes are too high (by 68% to 
56%, p=.001).
35 Two other breakdowns were statistically significant: college-educated 
people were much less likely to say that taxes are too high (by 51% versus 65%, p=.000), 
and employed people were more likely (by 65% versus 56%, p=.033). 
     While our survey was in the field, Congress was debating President Bush’s 2003 tax 
proposal (which subsequently passed) to advance the timing of the phased-in tax-rate 
reductions that had been enacted in 2001 and to establish a preferentially-low tax rate on 
dividends. So we asked respondents whether they favored or opposed this proposal, 
ordering this opinion question (on a randomized basis) either before or after the fact 
question about whether the typical American pays more in payroll or income taxes.
36 In 
this case, the answers did depend a bit on the ordering: Asking the payroll tax question 
first reduced support for the Bush tax cut by about five percentage points. But a chi-
square test did not reject the null hypothesis of the independence of responses and 
question order (p= 0.31). 
     Looking for differences by individual characteristics, we found that political ideology 
mattered quite strongly (p=.000). This time, conservatives were far more supportive of 
                                                 
35 It has been suggested to us that, even though the rich pay higher average tax rates, the utility loss from 
paying taxes may be proportionately greater for the poor.  
36 Note, however, that this question always came after the question about the tax share.   23
the Bush proposal (64%) than other groups (36%)—even though, as we have just seen, 
they were no more likely to deem taxes too high. Both the college-educated and self-
reported voters were more likely to oppose the 2003 Bush tax cuts (p=.000 and p=.003, 
respectively), and both whites and higher-income people were much more likely to favor 
them (p=.000 in both cases). Finally, employed people favored the Bush tax cuts more 
than non-employed people did. There were no significant differences by age or sex. 
The Federal Budget Deficit 
     The next opinion question was: 
•  How much of a problem do you think the federal budget deficit poses for the 
economy? Would you say it is not a problem at all, a minor problem, or a serious 
problem? 
 
We posed this question in two variants. In one case, we asked it after first inquiring about 
the size of the deficit. In the other case, we asked it after telling the respondent that “This 
year’s federal budget deficit is approximately $300 billion. This works out to around 
$3,000 per household.” Remember, the median estimate of those who were asked to 
estimate the size of the deficit was only $90 billion. So giving the $300 billion figure 
framed the deficit at a higher level for most respondent.  
     Telling respondents the actual size of the deficit did have a marked effect on their 
responses, as Table 10 shows. But oddly, doing so reduced the fraction who thought the 
deficit is a serious problem by about 9 percentage points. However, the χ
2 test for 
independence between order and response categories was only marginally significant (p-
value = .06).  
     We followed this question with two further queries about public policy toward the 
deficit: 
•  Do you think the federal budget deficit ought to be reduced? 
 
•  Do you think the deficit should be reduced mostly by raising taxes, mostly by 
cutting spending, or about equally by both means?   24
 
The second question was asked only of those who answered “yes” to the first, which was 
87.5% of the sample. Our respondents divided approximately evenly between those who 
favored “mostly by cutting spending” (45%) and those who favored “about equally by 
both means” (47%)—with a tiny minority (3%) favoring “mostly by raising taxes.” (The 
other 5% gave no coherent opinion.) Looking at population subgroups: 
     Demographics: Older people and women were far more likely than younger people 
and men to rate the deficit “a serious problem”—by almost-identical 65%-to-50% 
margins (p=.000). But ironically, and perhaps inconsistently, this belief did not make 
them more likely to “think the federal budget deficit ought to be reduced.” Nor were there 
significant gender or racial differences in the preferred cures for the deficit; but older 
Americans favored expenditure cuts more than younger Americans did. Finally, while 
whites worried less about the budget deficit than did nonwhites, they were nonetheless 
slightly more likely to favor reducing the deficit.  
     Economic status: The opinions of college-educated and non-college-educated 
respondents did not differ significantly on any of the three deficit-related questions. And 
the same was true when we compared the employed to the non-employed. However, 
lower-income people were considerably more likely than higher-income people to rate 
the deficit a serious problem (by 65% versus 53%, p=.012). That said, income did not 
significantly influence opinion on either of the other two deficit-related questions. 
     Political involvement: Unsurprisingly, political ideology mattered quite a bit (p=.000). 
In a sign of these unusual times, liberals were far more likely to rate the budget deficit a 
serious problem (72%) than either conservatives (44%) or non-politicals (56%).
37 In this 
                                                 
37 By contrast, an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll of 1,003 adults conducted in January 1995 found that 40 
percent of conservatives identified the federal budget deficit as the most important economic issue facing 
the country, while only 23 percent of liberals did so.  By a wide margin, the deficit was the most commonly 
cited issue by conservatives, but not by liberals (38% of whom cited unemployment) See Roper Center, 
Public Opinion Online Archive, University of Connecticut, Question ID USNBCWSJ.012095, R09A.      25
respect, moderates (at 67%) were closer to liberals. Yet, once again, there were no 
significant differences by ideology in the fraction of people who “think the federal budget 
deficit ought to be reduced.” (Almost everyone does.) Ideology showed through strongly 
again (p=.000), however, when it came to selecting the preferred method for reducing the 
deficit. For example, conservatives favored spending cuts over tax increases by a margin 
of 50% to 2%; among liberals, the corresponding margin was “just” 39% to 12%.
38 
Finally, “voters” and nonvoters did not differ much on any of the three deficit-related 
questions. 
The Minimum Wage 
     Our next query was straightforward: 
•  Do you think the federal minimum wage should be increased? 
 
The answers overwhelmingly favored a higher minimum wage: 
 
                 Yes                             75% 
        No                             21% 
        Don’t know/refused    4% 
 
We posed this question either before or after asking people what the current minimum 
age is, on a randomized basis. But the ordering made no difference. Disaggregating the 
sample by personal characteristics, we found: 
     Demographics: There were no significant differences in the answers to this question 
by age or employment status. But women and nonwhites were more likely to favor 
raising the minimum wage than men and whites—by margins of 81% to 69% (p=.000) 
for women and 93% to 74% (p=.000) for nonwhites. 
     Economic status: College-educated people were less likely to favor a higher minimum 
wage than the not-college-educated (by 66% to 83%, p=.000). Perhaps they learned about 
                                                 
38 The disengaged non-political group were like the conservatives in this respect. Moderates were in 
between.   26
the alleged disemployment effects of the minimum wage in a college economics course!
39 
And, as you would expect, lower-income people favored raising it more than higher-
income people did (by a margin of 85% versus 73%, p=.001). 
     Political involvement: Not surprisingly, attitudes toward the minimum wage differed 
significantly by political ideology (p=.000). Conservatives, though still supportive (at 
60%), were far less likely to favor raising it than were all other groups (which were in the 
85-89% approval range). Self-reported voters were also less likely to favor raising the 
minimum wage (by 74% versus 87%, p=.000). 
Social Security policy 
     In addition to the three fact questions mentioned above—pertaining to average Social 
Security benefits, the actuarial deficit, and President Bush’s partial privatization plan—
we asked two policy questions about Social Security. First, immediately after asking, 
“Are you aware that President Bush has proposed that part of Social Security be 
replaced by personal investment accounts?,” we posed the policy question: 
•  Do you favor or oppose this idea, or are you undecided? 
Second, right after asking “Are you aware that the Social Security System is projected to 
start running deficits about a decade from now?,” we inquired: 
•  Do you think the government should try to reduce those deficits mainly by raising the 
payroll tax, mainly by reducing Social Security benefits, or both? 
 
     Twenty percent of respondents favored partially replacing Social Security with 
personal accounts, while 38 percent opposed the idea and 42 percent were undecided.  As 
for closing the future Social Security deficit, respondents were roughly evenly divided 
between those who favored a mixture of both remedies (34%) and those who favored 
relying mainly on the payroll tax (30%). Only 5% wanted to rely mainly on benefit 
                                                 
39 The argument can be found in most beginning economics texts. For contrary evidence, see Card and 
Krueger (1995).  A survey by Fuller and Geide-Stevenson (2003) in fall 2000 found that 46% of members 
of the American Economic Association “mainly agreed” that, “Minimum wages increase unemployment 
among young and unskilled workers.”  Twenty-seven percent disagreed, and 28% agreed with provisos.     27
reductions, and a large 22% were undecided. Interestingly, this expressed preference for 
higher taxes over lower expenditures is just the reverse of what we found earlier, when 
we enquired about ways to reduce the overall budget deficit. Social Security, it appears, 
really is different. 
      Looking across subgroups, we found: 
     Demographics: There were no significant racial differences on either Social Security 
policy question. Men were much more likely to favor partial privatization than women 
(by 28% versus 13%, p=.000), and they were also less likely to favor tax increases to 
reduce the Social Security deficit (by 28% to 38%, p=.000). But the biggest differences, 
as one would expect, came by age. Older people were much more likely to oppose the 
privatization idea (by 46% versus 31%) and much less likely to be undecided (by 32% 
versus 50%). The curious consequence is that the proportion favoring the idea was 
roughly independent of age (about 20%). When it came to choosing between benefit cuts 
and tax increases as alternative ways to reduce the Social Security deficit, older 
Americans were more likely to choose “neither” (by 31% versus 18%)—even though that 
option was not offered in the question! Younger American were more likely to opt for 
“both” (by 45% versus 29%).  Both sets of differences are highly significant. 
     Economic status: Higher income people were much more likely to favor privatization 
(by 27% versus 12%, p=.000), as were the employed (by 24% versus 15%, p=.007), and 
the college-educated (by 33% versus 16%, p=.000). Differences by education were 
interesting. The percentages of college-educated and non-college-educated respondents 
opposing the Bush privatization proposal were about the same (roughly 38%). But many 
fewer of the college educated were undecided (28% versus 46%). There were no 
significant differences on how best to reduce the looming Social Security deficit—no 
group wanted to see benefits cut.    28
     Political involvement: Ideology is pretty much a no-brainer on this issue: 
Conservatives were vastly more likely to favor partial privatization (40%) than either 
liberals (9%), moderates (18%), or non-politicals (8%). Those who claim to have voted in 
the 2000 election were much more likely to favor privatization (by 25% versus 10%) and 
much less likely to be undecided (by 35% versus 54%). These differences are highly 
significant (p=.000). But again, the subgroups did not differ significantly in how they 
want to reduce the Social Security deficit.  Those who were aware of the President’s 
proposal were more inclined to support it (by 31% versus 7%).     29
Medicare and health insurance 
     We asked people whether Medicare currently included an outpatient drug benefit. (It 
did not at the time of the survey.) We followed that query by asking those who thought it 
did not (74% of all respondents): 
•  Would you favor or oppose adding a prescription drug benefit to Medicare for people 
who are not in the hospital, bearing in mind that it would have to be paid for 
somehow? 
 
Despite the last clause, which we deemed important, the general view was 
overwhelmingly supportive, with 80% in favor and only 12% opposed.
40 And opinions on 
this issue did not differ significantly by age (which we found surprising), sex, race, 
employment status, income, or self-reported voting behavior. College-educated people 
were a bit less likely to favor a Medicare drug benefit (by 82% versus 89%), but the 
difference was barely significant (p=.033). The only highly-significant difference was by 
political ideology, but the ordering here was somewhat counterintuitive: The proportion 
favoring a Medicare drug benefit was 95% among liberals, 89% among non-politicals, 
85% among conservatives, and 79% among moderates. 
     The other health policy question was: 
•  Do you favor or oppose what is called “universal health insurance coverage,” 
meaning that the government would make sure that every American is covered by a 
health insurance policy? 
 
Remember, asking about the number of uninsured Americans elicited a gross 
overestimate of the extent of the problem. Such a misconception might be expected to 
reduce support for universal coverage; but over 71% of our respondents favored it 
anyway.
41 On this policy issue, differences of opinion across subgroups were the rule 
rather than the exception: 
                                                 
40 The rest did not know or gave no opinion. Of course, as was pointed out at the Brookings panel meeting, 
we did not specify a particular way to pay for the drug benefit. 
41 However, the ordering of the questions mattered significantly in this case. When the policy question was 
asked before the inquiry about the number of uninsured, our respondents favored universal health insurance   30
     Demographics:Women were substantially more likely to favor universal health 
insurance than men (by 80% to 71%, p=.003), and nonwhites were much more likely to 
favor it than whites (by 87% versus 72%, p=.001). But there were no significant 
differences by age. 
     Economic status: Low-income people were much more supportive of universal 
coverage than were high-income people (who were probably covered in any case), by a 
margin of 80% to 70% (p=.000). And people without a college degree were significantly 
more likely to favor universal coverage than college graduates (by 78% to 68%, p=.001). 
But surprisingly, employment status did not matter. 
     Political involvement: The politically-disengaged nonvoters were much more likely to 
favor universal health insurance than were “voters,” by a margin of 85% to 71% 
(p=.000). Ideology mattered, too. Liberals strongly favored universal coverage (90%), 
while conservatives barely favored it (just 52%). Moderates (79%) and non-politicals 
(87%) fell in between, but much closer to the liberals (p=.000). 
 
Econometric Models of Knowledge and Public Opinion 
     We return now to the five-equation model outlined earlier. Our primary interest is in 
equations like (1), which explain people’s opinions on policy issues (OP) by their self-
interest (SI), ideology (ID), knowledge (K), education (ED), and other demographic 
controls (X). Recall that we identify the models by assuming a recursive structure. 
Readers unwilling to accept this assumption may be skeptical of our interpretation of the 
regression results—which is why we have reported only descriptive cross-tabulations up 
to now. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
by a margin of 74%-22%. When the ordering of the question was reversed, the margin fell to 67%-25%. So 
getting people to think about the magnitude of the problem did suppress support a bit.   31
Does information breed knowledge? 
     We begin with estimates of equation (2), which explains our admittedly imperfect 
measure of knowledge by information sources (quantity and nature), the desire to be 
informed, education, and other demographic variables. We tried measuring the 
respondents’ sources of information in several ways: (a) by QH and QL, the two intensity-
of-use variables defined earlier; (b) by the primary source of information; and (c) by a set 
of 22 dummy variables indicating, for each of the 11 sources, whether the respondent 
uses that source “regularly” or “occasionally”. In the case of (c), we found that, once 
demographics were controlled for, the 22 source dummies were jointly insignificant (at 
the 10% level). So we eliminated option (c) and concentrated on the other two. 
     Table 11 begins with a linear regression with K on the left-hand side and only QH, QL , 
and demographics on the right-hand side (column 1). The fit is mediocre (R
2 = 0.17), and 
QH and QL are jointly insignificant—a result anticipated by Table 9. More educated 
people, higher-income people, and married people are significantly more knowledgeable.   
     Column 2 adds a set of three dummies indicating (in descending order) the 
respondent’s desire to be informed. All three are significant at the 5% level, and the 
pattern of the coefficients means that people with more desire to be informed do obtain 
higher knowledge scores. But the adjusted R
2 barely increases.  
     In column 3, we add a set of political ideology and interest variables. Liberals, 
conservatives, and moderates (the control group) are no different in terms of knowledge. 
But people who haven’t thought about their ideology score significantly lower (though 
only at the 10% level of significance). People who report themselves to have voted score 
significantly higher. 
     Finally, in a fourth regression not displayed here, we added ten dummies for the most 
important source of information. Three of the ten coefficients (for newspapers, 
magazines, and economists) are significant at the 10% level, and each indicates higher   32
scores than the base group (which is television). The F-test for the ten dummies as a 
group also indicates statistical significance (F=1.88, p=.045). The other results hardly 
change. 
     Thus our overall conclusion is that both education and the desire to be informed affect 
an individual’s knowledge positively, although the magnitude of the education effect is 
modest.
42  The nature of the respondent’s primary source of information does affect his or 
her K score, but the general intensity of information use does not. To educators, these 
results must be considered somewhat disheartening, although we acknowledge that the 
brief test embedded in our survey assesses only a limited range of factual knowledge—
and that, even as such, the test is highly imperfect. 
 
Who believes what? And why? 
     For each of the five policy areas mentioned above, we now seek to estimate the 
relative roles of self-interest, ideology, and knowledge in forming public opinion—
equations (1) in the model. In some sense, this is the natural culmination of our enquiry, 
since information usage and knowledge are, in this context, just way-stations on the road 
to public opinion. 
The Bush Tax Cuts 
     Because 31% of respondents offered intermediate responses (either a mixed opinion or 
no opinion), we estimated ordered probit models for opinion on the 2003 Bush tax cut 
proposals with three choices: oppose, mixed response, or favor—in ascending order. 
Thus positive coefficients in Table 12 indicate more favorable attitudes toward the Bush 
tax cuts. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients in an ordered probit model are not 
easy to interpret, but the relative magnitudes are. For example, we see in column 1 that 
                                                 
42 Four more years of education raise the test score by 4-5 points, or about one-quarter of a standard 
deviation.   33
the coefficient of the dummy variable for being black is ten times as large as the 
coefficient for years of education. That means that being black has the same effect on the 
underlying probabilities as ten more years of education. 
     The  estimates reported in Table 12 are interesting and, for the most part, indicative of 
what we will learn later about opinion on other policy issues.  Column 1 begins by trying 
to explain attitudes toward the tax cut by purely demographic variables, plus (log) 
income. Since the tax cut proposal was highly regressive, household income should be an 
excellent measure of self-interest here.
43 The model does not explain much—the pseudo-
R
2 measure of goodness-of-fit is below 0.02. Furthermore, virtually none of the 
demographic variables in column (1) matter. More educated people and blacks are more 
opposed to the tax cuts. That’s about it.
44 (Remember, when we looked at simple 
correlations, several demographic variables were significant.) While household income 
gets the correct sign in all three models in Table 12—that is, richer people do favor the 
tax cuts more—the coefficient is never significant. Where have you gone, homo 
economicus?
45  
     Column 2 adds a host of ideology and knowledge variables. Many of them are 
significant, and the pseudo-R
2 jumps dramatically to 0.12.
46 χ
2 tests (reported in square 
brackets in the table) clearly show that both ideology and knowledge are strongly 
associated with opinions on the tax cuts. 
     Ideology is measured both by political ideology, as discussed above, and by opinions 
on (a) whether the tax burden is too high or too low and (b) whether taxes should be 
                                                 
43 Unlike the case of the 2001 tax cut, the 2003 tax cut offered virtually no benefits to low- and moderate-
income taxpayers. 
44 Among our four controls for marital status (not shown in the table), one is significant (p-value=.01): 
divorced and separated people are more likely to favor the Bush tax cuts. 
45 Both Bartels (2003) and Slemrod (2003) emphasize the role of popular misconceptions in generating 
public opinion on tax policy in general and on the Bush tax cuts in particular. Slemrod finds that more 
educated people suffer somewhat less from these misconceptions.  
46 This is not an entirely clean comparison since the sample size drops from 874 to 722 observations owing 
to missing data.   34
progressive.
47  Column 2 of Table 12 shows that ideology matters quite a lot. 
Conservatives are much more favorably disposed toward the tax cuts, and liberals are 
much more opposed (compared to the base group, which was moderates). Similarly, 
those who think taxes are too high are vastly more likely to favor the Bush tax proposal 
than are those who think taxes are too low.
48 (In this case, the omitted group is: taxes are 
about right.) Finally, those who believe taxes should be progressive are less likely to 
favor the Bush proposal, though this coefficient becomes insignificant in the model in 
column 3. 
     Knowledge is measured in two ways: general and specific to tax policy. Our 
constructed K score measures general knowledge. Specific knowledge about taxes is 
measured by (a) the estimated tax share and (b) whether the respondent knows that most 
people pay more in payroll taxes than in income taxes. (Remember, these two indicators 
of specific knowledge are also part of the general knowledge score.) While general 
knowledge matters in the estimated model, specific knowledge about taxes does not—and 
most of the coefficients appear to be incorrectly signed. (The finding about general 
knowledge is the one result in Table 12 that is not typical of what is to come.) The a 
priori “correct” sign on the coefficient of K is unclear, since the composite score 
measures knowledge of facts, not of economic theory, labor supply elasticities, or 
anything like that. But those with more factual knowledge about the economy apparently 
are less supportive of the Bush tax cut proposal, ceteris paribus. 
     In column 3, we add a pair of dummy variables for whether the respondent believes 
the budget deficit is a major problem or a minor problem (the omitted category is “no 
problem at all”). It seems obvious that views on this question should influence support 
                                                 
47 The precise question is: “Do you agree or disagree with the statement that higher income households 
should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than lower income households?” 
48 Readers can decide for themselves whether they want to think of this as an “ideology” variable. But 
remember, the regression already controls for the estimated tax share.   35
for the Bush tax cuts—and they do. However, the standard identification assumption may 
be difficult to sustain in this case. It seems quite possible that, say, some unmeasured 
influence (call it “liking George Bush”) that makes a respondent favor the Bush tax cut 
also makes him downplay the importance of budget deficits. Hence, some readers may 
prefer to ignore column 3. Fortunately, including or excluding these two variables does 
not change the other coefficients much. 
Reducing the Federal Budget Deficit 
     As just mentioned, we began this part of the questionnaire by asking all respondents 
how much of a problem they think the federal budget deficit poses.
49 We ordered the 
three possible responses in ascending order of concern about the deficit: no problem at 
all, a minor problem, or a serious problem. So positive coefficients in the ordered probit 
estimates of Table 13 indicate greater concern. 
     As the reader may recall, about half the respondents were asked how large they think 
the deficit is, but fewer than half answered the question. So, while it seems sensible to 
use the estimated deficit as a regressor, doing so would shrink the sample by more than 
three-quarters. For this reason, Table 13 presents only regressions that exclude the 
estimated deficit variable. Suffice it to say that equations that included the estimated 
deficit (a) showed that people who think the deficit is larger are more worried about it 
and (b) including the estimated deficit does not change the signs of the other coefficients. 
     As before, we start with an initial model that includes only demographic variables plus 
the only self-interest variable we could think of for the deficit issue: income—which 
becomes insignificant once we control for ideology (see column 2). The fit is poor, 
though better than in Table 12. Women, blacks, older people, and more-educated people 
are more concerned about the deficit (the latter barely so). 
                                                 
49 There was a more direct policy question--whether the respondent thought the deficit should  be 
reduced—but the vast majority of respondents answered yes, making the answers rather uninteresting to 
analyze.   36
          The ideology variables, which are added in column 2, are more interesting—and 
adding them more than doubles the pseudo-R
2. Conservatives are less concerned about 
the deficit than are liberals and moderates, and those with “other” ideologies look a lot 
like conservatives in this respect. Similarly, people who favor progressive taxation—
another way to identify liberals?—are significantly more concerned. People who think 
taxes are too high are more worried about the deficit, while people who think taxes are 
too low are less worried. (Column 3 shows that the first of these coefficients is significant 
at the 5% level, while the second is not.) This finding may indicate that many 
respondents expect the eventual cure for the deficit problem to be higher taxes. When it 
comes to knowledge, neither our composite score nor specific knowledge about taxes 
affect opinion on the deficit significantly.  
     Opinions vary greatly on the methods that should be used to reduce the deficit. Here 
we estimated two probit models, both shown in Table 14, running the model only on the 
subset of respondents who said the deficit ought to be reduced. Since the choices were 
“raising taxes”, “cutting spending”, or “both”, we created two binary variables: 
                                 Taxes   = 1 if the respondent chose raising taxes or both 
                                             = 0 otherwise 
 
                                 Spending = 1 if the respondent chose cutting spending or both 
                                                 = 0 otherwise 
and estimated an ordinary probit model for each. The model for “Spending” is less 
interesting, however, since almost everyone thinks spending cuts should be part of the 
solution, while our respondents split almost 50-50 on whether higher taxes should be part 
of the solution. 
     What do we find? Beginning with self-interest, higher-income people are slightly less 
likely to favor raising taxes and slightly more likely to favor cutting spending. But neither 
coefficient is generally significant. Thus, once again, self interest seems to matter little. 
And in this case, ideology also matters rather less than might be expected: Liberals and   37
people of “other” ideologies are far less likely to favor cuts in spending. Naturally, people 
who believe that taxes are already too high are far less likely to favor the tax-hike 
alternative and far more likely to favor spending cuts; and those who think taxes are too 
low hold the opposite views. Self-professed voters are less enthusiastic about cutting 
spending and a bit more enthusiastic about raising taxes than are non-voters, but the 
coefficients are not always significant. Respondents with higher levels of general 
economic knowledge are marginally less likely to favor tax hikes. And those who 
(wrongly) believe that income taxes are typically larger than payroll taxes are much less 
enamored of tax hikes. Among the demographic variables, the only consistently 
significant effect is that older people are less likely to favor raising taxes. 
Raising the Minimum Wage 
     Table 15 displays a series of ordinary (binary) probit models to explain support for 
raising the minimum wage. Separating self-interest from some of the demographic 
determinants of opinion is tricky in this case because our survey offers no direct 
information on respondents’ wage rates. We do, however, measure several obvious 
correlates of wages such as income, race, sex, and education—all of which show up as 
significant determinants of opinion in column 1. In each case, the sign of the coefficient 
is consistent with the simple hypothesis that lower-wage people are more likely to favor 
raising the minimum wage than higher-wage people.  Apart from these potential wage 
proxies, the demographic variables are insignificant. 
     Following the pattern of previous tables, columns 2 and 3 of Table 15 add ideology 
and knowledge variables to the model. While ideology once again contributes notably to 
explaining opinion, only conservatives stand out from the pack in being less favorably 
disposed toward raising the minimum wage. 
     The knowledge variables are more interesting. General knowledge is irrelevant, but 
people who believe the existing minimum wage is higher are decidedly less likely to   38
support raising it. Similarly, those who believe that a higher minimum wage would cause 
the loss of either “a lot of” (6% of the sample) or “some” jobs (36%) are much less likely 
to favor raising it than are those who believe that “hardly anyone” would lose their job 
(57% of the sample). Comparing columns 2 and 3 shows that these three “specific 
knowledge” variables contribute enormously to the goodness of fit. 
     The minimum wage is arguably the one policy that we have examined where a good 
case can be made that self-interest—or, at least, group interest—and economic beliefs 
and knowledge are as strong an influence on public opinion as ideology.  For example, 
when the estimated coefficients shown in column 3 are translated into marginal effects on 
probabilities, we find that self-identified conservatives are 13 percentage points less 
likely than liberals to support a minimum wage increase.  Similarly, support for an 
increase is 14 points higher for blacks than for whites, 16 points higher for those in the 
poorest 15% of households than for those in the richest 15%, 10 points higher for women 
than for men, and an impressive 58 points higher among those who believe that a lot of 
workers will lose their jobs from an increase than among those who believe hardly 
anyone will lose their job.  
Social Security Policy 
 
     We asked two questions about Social Security policy: whether respondents support 
President Bush’s plan for partial privatization, and how (if at all) the Social Security 
deficit should be reduced. 
     Where Social Security was concerned, we included several novel self-interest 
variables, in addition to income, in the survey. (See the upper portion of Table 16.) 
Broadening the concept of self-interest just a bit, we asked whether the respondent’s 
mother, father, or both were still alive. We also asked respondents whether they expected 
Social Security to be a “major source” of retirement income, a “minor source”, or “not 
much of a source at all”. Presumably, people in the first category have a much greater   39
stake in the outcome of the Social Security debate.  And older workers should have more 
of a stake in the current system.   
     When it comes to attitudes toward personal accounts, the subjective self-interest 
measure of anticipated Social Security income “works,” while the more objective ones—
income, whether the parents are alive, and age—have inconsistent and weak effects, 
although they are sometimes significant in the expected direction. The χ
2 tests for the 
entire group of self-interest variables show statistical significance beyond the 1% level in 
columns 2 and 3, and the importance of Social Security benefits in retirement income is 
significant in all specifications.   
     The knowledge variables—whether general or specific to Social Security—make little 
contribution to explaining opinions on privatizing Social Security. As noted earlier, 
respondents who are aware of President Bush’s proposal are more likely to support it; but 
the difference is not significant (p-value = .19). More educated people are slightly more 
likely to favor partial privatization. 
      Political ideology matters much more than knowledge. Not surprisingly, 
conservatives are much more likely to back privatization and liberals are more likely to 
oppose it. 
     In the questions about how to reduce the actuarial deficit, the choices were “mainly by 
raising the payroll tax” (chosen by 30% of respondents), “mainly by reducing Social 
Security benefits” (5%), or “both” (34%).
50 We created two dummy variables analogous 
to the two we created for deficit-reduction policy: 
                                 SS-Taxes      = 1 if the respondent chose raising payroll taxes or both 
                                                      = 0 otherwise 
 
                                 SS-Spending = 1 if the respondent chose cutting benefits or both 
                                                       = 0 otherwise, 
 
and ran binary probit models for each. The results are displayed in Table 17. 
                                                 
50 We excluded those who did not answer (9% of the sample) and those who said “neither” (22%).   40
     Our ability to explain people’s opinions on this important public policy issue is quite 
modest (pseudo-R
2s are in the .06-.07 range in both cases). Surprisingly, and in contrast 
to the results in Table 16, the six self-interest variables are not significant determinants of 
opinion, either individually or as a group, once political ideology variables are included. 
Nor does ideology itself matter very much. (The χ
2 statistics are insignificant in all cases.) 
Knowledge does matter, however. Respondents with higher general knowledge are a bit 
less likely to favor raising the payroll tax, and people with higher estimates of monthly 
Social Security benefits are, surprisingly, less likely to want to cut them. (But the 
coefficient is barely significant at the 10% level.) Interestingly, those who say they are 
aware of President Bush’s privatization proposal, are significantly (at the 5% level) less 
willing to cut Social Security benefits. 
     On the demographics, women and students are significantly less inclined to cut 
benefits, while Hispanics are (barely) significantly more inclined. Unemployed people 
are decidedly less enthusiastic than others about raising payroll taxes. 
Health insurance policy 
     Our last two policy questions pertain to health insurance. As mentioned above, we 
asked respondents whether they favored adding a prescription drug benefit to Medicare 
and whether they favored universal coverage. 
     In addition to age and income, the survey included what we believed would be useful 
self-interest variables tailored to these questions. We asked whether the respondent’s 
parents are alive, and whether the respondent or anyone in his or her immediate family is 
uninsured. We begin with Table 18, which displays the results for an ordinary probit 
model of opinion on universal health insurance coverage. 
     Higher-income people are significantly more opposed to universal coverage (p=.000), 
and uninsured respondents are more likely to favor it (p=.004 in column 1, but p=.108 in   41
column 2).
51  However, neither age nor having an uninsured family member affects one’s 
opinion.  The coefficients on own insurance coverage imply that people who lack health 
insurance are 12 points more likely to support universal coverage in column 1 and 8 
points more likely in column 2.  As usual, measures of political ideology are successful as 
regressors. Liberals are far more likely to favor universal coverage, and conservatives are 
much more likely to oppose it. Interestingly, those politically-engaged “voters” are less 
likely to favor universal coverage. Knowledge appears to have a modest effect on 
opinions on universal coverage. The general knowledge score is irrelevant, as usual. But 
people with higher estimates of the uncovered population are a bit more likely to favor 
universal coverage.
52  Finally, demographic variables do not seem to matter—not even 
age. Blacks are more likely (than whites) to favor universal coverage in column 1, but the 
coefficient becomes insignificant once ideology and knowledge are added to the equation 
(column 2). 
     In Table 19, we explore the determinants of public opinion on adding a prescription 
drug benefit to Medicare, limiting our sample to respondents who, at the time of the 
survey, knew that Medicare did not cover prescription drugs. Here, demographics matter 
more than they do on most other policy issues. Blacks and more-educated people are far 
less likely to support such a benefit, while students are much more likely to support it. 
The results on self-interest, ideology, and knowledge are by now familiar: self-interest 
and knowledge are not significant determinants of opinion, but political ideology is. In 
particular, liberals and respondents with “other” (than liberal, conservative, or moderate) 
ideology are substantially more likely to support a prescription drug benefit. So are self-
professed voters, at least in two of the three specifications. 
                                                 
51 Our results indicate more of an impact of self-interest on support for universal health insurance than was 
found in previous research. For example, Sears, et al. (1980) find that a respondent’s support for 
government-funded national health insurance is unrelated to his own health insurance coverage.   
52 The coefficient implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the presumed uncovered population is 
associated with a 3 percentage point increase in support for universal health insurance.   42
 
Conclusion 
     Taken as a whole, our survey results hold little good news for those of us engaged in 
economic education and/or economic policy—or for economic theorists who use homo 
economicus as the backbone of their models of political economy.   
     On the positive side, a representative national sample of Americans does express a 
strong desire to be well-informed about major economic policy issues. And their factual 
knowledge is, on average, reasonable. From where does their information come? The 
short answer is television, followed at a (long) distance by local (rather than national) 
newspapers. Unfortunately, as a source of information, television does far better on 
quantity than on quality. For example, it ranks eighth among the 11 possible sources of 
information in its contribution to our constructed measure of economic knowledge, 
although we recognize that one can question the direction of causality here. Perhaps more 
disconcerting, economic knowledge is barely higher in people who (a) use more sources 
of information, (b) use information more intensively, or (c) express a stronger desire to be 
informed. On the other hand, people with more education and more income are more 
knowledgeable. 
     As a broad generalization—to which many exceptions have been noted in this paper—
ideology seems to play a stronger role in shaping opinion on economic policy issues than 
either self-interest or knowledge, although specific (as opposed to general) knowledge 
does influence opinion on a number of matters.
53 This finding is not terribly different 
from the conclusion reached by Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba (1998) in their survey of 
professional economists: Left-right ideology seemed to shape opinion more than 
parameter estimates did. The contrast with homo economicus—who is well-informed, 
                                                 
53 Of course, our K variable measures knowledge with considerable error, which probably biases its 
coefficient downward.    43
non-ideological, and extremely self-interested—could hardly be more stark. Instead, our 
findings seem more consistent with an idea expressed in the political science literature: 
that people often use ideology as a short-cut heuristic for deciding what position to take, 
when properly informing oneself is difficult.
54   
     In closing, we offer two speculative explanations for this basic finding: confusion and 
generosity of spirit. Both explanations start from the premise that people typically 
develop conventional (“ideological”) beliefs about how the world works and about what 
is good for them and for the commonweal. Thereafter, the two explanations diverge. The 
confusion explanation emphasizes how misperceptions of their own self-interest can lead 
people to act (or, in our case, to speak) against their best interests.
55 The generosity 
explanation emphasizes that, at least when it comes to national economic policy, people 
are often more interested in what they perceive to be the common good than they are in 
their own narrow self-interest.
56 In both cases, there is at least room for hope that greater 
knowledge will improve decisionmaking, even though it appears from our survey that 
efforts in this dimension have shown less than impressive results to date.   
                                                 
54 See, for example, Lupia (1994). 
55 Bartels (2003) and Slemrod (2003) fall squarely within this camp. Romer (2003) provides a start at 
modeling political outcomes under the assumption that voters have systematic misperceptions.   
56 See Caplan (2002) and the essays in Mansbridge (1990) for further discussion of how group interests 
affect public opinion and voting.    44
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Reasons for Wanting to be Informed 
Reason  Percent saying yes 
Affects personal finances  54% 
Affects business or profession  7% 
Relevant to stock market, investments  4% 
Economic issues are important politically;  
  might affect my vote 
22% 
To be a responsible citizen;  
  just like to keep informed 
55% 








Frequency of use of alternative sources of information 






1. Television  61  30  9 
2. Newspapers  49  26  25 
3. Friends  or  relatives  35  42  22 
4. Political  leaders  35  40  25 
5. Radio  26  23  50 
6. Economists  17  36  46 
7. Internet  21  18  61 
8. Business  leaders  12  31  57 
9.  Civic or religious leaders  10  27  62 
10. Magazines  12  21  67 
11. Books    7  14  79 
Note: The three italicized sources of information are not themselves delivery channels; 
information from these sources must presumably arrive via one or more of the eight 




Most important sources of information 
Rank Source  Percent 
1. Television  46.7% 
2. Newspapers  18.6% 
3. Internet  10.0% 
4. Radio  8.9% 
5. Friends  and  relatives  6.6% 
6. Political  leaders  2.3% 
7. Magazines  2.2% 
8.  Civic or religious leaders   1.2% 
9. Business  leaders  1.2% 
10. Economists  1.1% 
11. Books  0.5% 
                              Note: The numbers indicate the percentage of respondents 




Proportion Reading Various Newspapers, by Ideology 
 
                                                                                 Haven't 
Newspaper         Liberal  Conservative  Moderate  Thought   P-value 
NY Times                .23           .03              .09           .02     .000 
Wall St. Jnl.         .05           .10        .09           .03        .001 
Wash. Post         .06           .01        .01           .00        .000 
USA Today          .08           .07        .12           .04         .013 
Other Big City        .25           .25        .18           .14         .002 
Local Newspaper   .44           .55        .56           .56         .066 
 
Note: P-value is for a test of the hypothesis that a constant proportion of members 
in all ideological groups use the particular source.   
 
Table 5 
Frequency Distributions of QH and QL 
Range   Frequency
 for QH 
Frequency
 for QL 
0.0 to 0.1 .320  .055 
0.1 to 0.2 .196  .076 
0.2 to 0.3 .205  .114 
0.3 to 0.4 .132  .165 
0.4 to 0.5 .070  .179 
0.5 to 0.6 .039  .151 
0.6 to 0.7 .025  .124 
0.7 to 0.8 .009  .075 
0.8 to 0.9 .004  .042 
0.9 to 1.0 .0003  .019   49
 
Table 6 
Economic Knowledge: Actual versus Survey Estimates 






Tax share  23.3%  31.3%  15.6%  30% 
Payroll or income tax is larger?  payroll (83%)  income (52%)  --  income 
Size of budget deficit  $246-$310b  $334b  $739b  $90b 
Level of minimum wage  $5.15  $5.86  $1.27  $5.65 
Size of SS check  $898  $824  $493  $800 
Know Bush SS proposal?  Yes  yes (56%)  --  yes 
Know SS deficits coming?  Yes  yes (69%)  --  yes 
Medicare drug benefit?  No  no  (54%)  --  no 
Percent without health 
insurance 





Knowledge Score, by Desire to Keep Well-Informed 
How important is it to 
keep well-informed? 
Mean K score 
(percentile) 
% of sample 
Extremely important  43.8  23.8% 
Very important  43.3  50.2% 
Somewhat important  42.5  23.4% 
Not very important or  





Knowledge Score, Ranked by Most Important Source of Information 
Rank  Most important source  Mean K score  % of sample 
1.  Magazines  52.7    2.2% 
2.  Economists  50.3    1.1% 
3. Newspapers  46.8  18.6% 
4.  Business leaders  46.1    1.2% 
5. Internet  45.9  10.1% 
6.  Books  43.7    0.5% 
7.  Radio  42.3    8.9% 
8.  Television  41.1    46.6% 
9.  Political leaders  40.9     2.3% 
10.  Friends and relatives  39.9   6.6% 
11.  Civic/religious leaders  35.0    1.2% 
 





Knowledge Score, Ranked by Number of Sources Used Regularly 
Number  Mean K score  % of sample 
5+ 45.5    14.4% 
4 43.5   13.0% 
3  46.1    20.9% 
2  44.4    19.4% 
1  39.4    21.2% 









Opinions on How Big a Problem the Deficit Poses 
Opinion Told  the 
 Number 
Not told the 
number 
All 
A serious problem  50%  59%  54% 
A minor problem  38%  33%  36% 
Not a problem  5%  3%  4% 
Don’t know  6%  5%  5% 
  Table 11 
          OLS Regressions for Economic Knowledge Scores (K) 
Variable 
Coefficient                        
(Standard Error) 
1                  2                    3 
Intensity of Use  [0.13]  [0.28]  [0.67] 
QH 4.85  4.41  2.94 
   (3.80) (3.84) (3.87) 
QL -2.11  -1.20  -0.13 
   (3.21)  (3.21)  (3.24) 
Desire to be Informed     [0.04]  [0.19] 
Extremely important   --      10.05***    7.91** 
      (3.60)  (3.69) 
Very important   --      8.44**    6.83* 
      (3.50)  (3.58) 
Somewhat important   --   8.04**    6.39* 
      (3.55)  (3.64) 
Ideology/Political        [0.05] 
Liberal     --   --  -1.00 
        (1.78) 
Conservative   --   --  -1.27 
         (1.55) 
No thought   --   --    -3.06* 
        (1.61) 
Other Ideology   --   --  2.33 
         (2.81) 
Voted   --   --     2.65** 
        (1.31) 
Demographics  [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
Log income    1.96**  2.07**  2.01** 
   (0.82)  (0.82)  (0.82) 
Age 0.00  0.00  -0.01 
   (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Years of education  1.25***  1.25***  1.01*** 
   (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.26) 
Female    -1.75  -1.86*  -1.24 
   (1.09)  (1.09)  (1.10) 
Black     -2.33  -2.60  -2.87 
   (1.70)  (1.70)  (1.74) 
Other race  -6.40***  -6.32***  -5.86*** 
   (2.01)  (2.01)  (2.03) 
Hispanic 0.38  0.30  0.40 
   (2.05)  (2.05)  (2.06) 
Unemployed 4.14*  3.87  3.88 
   (2.39)  (2.38)  (2.40) 
Retired -1.12  -1.06  -1.22 
   (1.93)  (1.93)  (1.95) 
Homemaker -1.50  -1.43  -1.10 
   (2.47)  (2.47)  (2.47) 
Student/other -0.38  -0.18    0.06 
   (1.65)  (1.65)  (1.68) 
Married 4.70***  4.15***    3.64** 
   (1.53)  (1.54)  (1.55) 
Number of observations   881  879  867 
R
2   0.17  0.18  0.19   
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors 
in parentheses. P-value for test of joint 
significance  of variables in brackets. 
 
a Model also included demographic 
controls for five categories of marital 
status, not shown here. 
  
b Omitted category is moderate 
c Omitted category is neither 
d Omitted category is neither 
e Omitted category is white 
f Omitted category is employed 
 
*** Denotes significantly different from 
zero at the 1 % level. 
** Denotes significantly different from 
zero at the 5 % level. 
* Denotes significantly different from 
zero at the 10 % level   52
Table 12 




1                     2                    3 
Self-interest  [.13]  [.160]  [.147] 
Log income  0.09  0.10 0.11 
   (0.06)  (0.07) (0.08) 
Ideology/Political     [.000]  [.000] 
Liberal   --     -0.41***      -0.43*** 
      (0.15) (0.15) 
Conservative   --      0.70***       0.60*** 
      (0.13) (0.14) 
No thought   --  0.03 -0.02 
      (0.13) (0.14) 
Other ideology
b   --  -0.27   -0.45* 
      (0.23) (0.24) 
Voted   --  -0.11 -0.06 
       (0.11)  (0.12) 
Taxes too high   --       0.57***      0.63*** 
      (0.10) (0.10) 
Taxes too low
c   --    -0.70**     -0.78** 
      (0.30) (0.31) 
Likes progressivity   --  -0.16* -0.08 
      (0.09) (0.10) 
Knowledge     [.005]  [.006] 
K score   --      -0.012***     -0.011*** 
      (0.003) (0.003) 
Tax share   --  -0.09 0.09 
      (0.30) (0.31) 
Income tax larger   --  -0.12 -0.13 
      (0.09) (0.10) 
Other opinions        [.000] 
Deficit major problem   --  --      -0.70*** 
      -- (0.24) 
Deficit minor problem
d   --  -- -0.24 
      -- (0.24) 
Demographics
a  [.004]  [.162]  [.239] 
Years of education    -.037**  0.017 0.020 
   (.018)  (0.022) (0.023) 
Age -.001  0.0007 0.0031 
   (.004)  (0.0043) (0.0045) 
Female 0.017  -0.05  0.004 
   (0.082) (0.09)  (0.098) 
Black     -.35***   -0.26*  -0.22 
   (.12)  (0.15) (0.16) 
Other race
e .004  -0.11 -0.07 
   (.156)  (0.18) (0.18) 
Hispanic .20     0.38**      0.41** 
   (.16)  (0.18) (0.18) 
Unemployed -.15  -0.002 0.09 
   (.17)  (0.21) (0.21) 
Retired -.004  0.01 -0.04 
   (.146)  (0.17) (0.18) 
Homemaker .13  0.27 0.23 
   (.19)  (0.22) (0.23) 
Student/other
f -.17  -0.13 -0.05 
   (.12)  (0.14) (0.15) 
Number of observations  874  722  697 
Log Likelihood    -921  -680  -645 
Pseudo-R
2   .018  0.12  0.14 
 
See notes to Table 11.       53
Table 13 
Ordered probit model for view of deficit 
Dep. Var.: 3=Serious Problem; 2=Minor Problem; 1=Not a Problem 
 
Variable 
Coefficient                
(Standard Error) 
1                2              3 
Self-interest  [.01]  [.16]  [.30] 
Log income  -.17**  -.11 -.08 
 (.07)  (.08) (.08) 
Ideology/Political    [.00]  [.00] 
Liberal --  .01 -.01 
   (.16) (.16) 
Conservative --  -.53*** -.62*** 
   (.13) (.14) 
No thought  --  -.19 -.24 
   (.15) (.15) 
Other ideology
b --  -.46* -.51** 
   (.24) (.25) 
Voted --  .07 .10 
   (.12) (.13) 
Taxes too high  --  -- .20** 
    (.10) 
Taxes too low
c --  -- -.31 
    (.26) 
Likes progressivity  --  .30*** .34*** 
   (.10) (.10) 
Knowledge    [.81]  [.84] 
K score  --  .001 .002 
   (.004) (.004) 
Tax share  --  .003 .003 
   (.003) (.003) 
Income tax larger  --  -.02 -.00 
   (.10) (.10) 
Survey Design  [.02]  [.07]  [.08] 
Question Order
d .20**  .18*  .17* 
 (.09)  (.10)  (.10) 
Demographics
a  [.00]  [.00]  [.00] 
Years of education  .03*  .01 .01 
 (.02)  (.02) (.02) 
Age .009**  .010** .010** 
 (.004)  (.005) (.005) 
Female .24***  .37*** .34*** 
 (.09)  (.10) (.10) 
Black .35**  .43** .40** 
 (.15)  (.18) (.18) 
Other race
e .19  .16 .15 
 (.17)  (.19) (.19) 
Hispanic .16  .16 .12 
 (.17)  (.19) (.19) 
Unemployed .15  .36 .33 
 (.20)  (.24) (.24) 
Retired -.24  -.21 -.20 
 (.16)  (.19) (.19) 
Homemaker -.24  -.40* -.26 
 (.20)  (.22) (.23) 
Student/other
f .10  .25 .30* 
 (.14)  (.16) (.16) 
Number of observations  842  716  701 
Log Likelihood  -661  -535  -516 
Pseudo-R
2 .04  .09  .10 
See notes to Table 11. 
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Table 14 
How to reduce the deficit: raise taxes, cut spending or both? 
 
Model:  Taxes Part of Solution  Spending Part of Solution 
   1  2  3  4  5  6 
Self Interest  [0.077]  [0.679]  [0.385]  [0.130]  [0.082]  [0.112] 
Log Income  -0.022  -0.031  -0.073  0.165  0.200*  0.220 
   (0.073)  (0.074)  (0.085)  (0.109)  (0.115)  (0.138) 
Ideology/Political  ---  [0.278]  [0.584]  ---  [0.000]  [0.001] 
Liberal ---  -0.027  -0.072  ---  -0.612***  -0.685*** 
     (0.158)  (0.174)    (0.224)  (0.257) 
Conservative ---  -0.197  -0.104  ---  0.237  0.061 
     (0.138)  (0.151)    (0.239)  (0.269) 
No thought  ---  -0.278  -0.217  ---  0.247  0.140 
     (0.145)  (0.160)    (0.258)  (0.299) 
Other ideology  ---  -0.408**  -0.435  ---  -0.624*  -0.818** 
     (0.264)  (0.282)    (0.324)  (0.368) 
Voted ---  0.022  0.050  ---  -0.347*  -0.501* 
     (0.118)  (0.133)    (0.213)  (0.258) 
Knowledge  ---  [0.095]  [0.007]  ---  [0.316]  [0.372] 
K score  ---  -0.005*  -0.008*  ---  -0.005  -0.005 
     (0.003)  (0.004)    (0.005)  (0.007) 
Tax Share  ---  ---  0.000  ---  ---  0.008 
       (0.004)      (0.007) 
Income tax larger  ---  ---  -0.340***  ---  ---  -0.097 
       (0.108)      (0.184) 
Other Opinions  ---    [0.000]  ---  ---  [0.002] 
Likes Progressivity  ---  ---  0.063  ---  ---  -0.004 
       (0.110)      (0.196) 
Taxes too high  ---  ---  -0.630***  ---  ---    0.521*** 
       (0.116)      (0.191) 
Taxes too low  ---  ---  0.525  ---  ---  -0.668** 
       (0.330)      (0.338) 
Demographics  [0.005]  [0.026]  [0.062]  [0.135]  [0.886]  [0.841] 
Years of Education  -0.012  -0.028  -0.049*  -0.098***  -0.047  -0.013 
   (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.032)  (0.037)  (0.043) 
Age -0.011**  -0.010**  -0.010**  -0.006  -0.003  0.006 
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Female -0.059  -0.096  -0.090  0.076  0.048  0.130 
   (0.097)  (0.099)  (0.109)  (0.152)  (0.164)  (0.186) 
Black -0.143  -0.118  -0.167  -0.163  -0.061  -0.237 
   (0.153)  (0.159)  (0.184)  (0.227)  (0.249)  (0.297) 
Other race  0.167  0.164  0.108  0.023  -0.111  -0.227 
   (0.186)  (0.188)  (0.209)  (0.280)  (0.295)  (0.323) 
Hispanic 0.093  0.041  -0.079  -0.091  0.002  -0.077 
   (0.188)  (0.190)  (0.213)  (0.275)  (0.297)  (0.312) 
Unemployed 0.036  0.012  -0.344  -0.278  -0.309  -0.449 
   (0.211)  (0.216)  (0.245)  (0.299)  (0.321)  (0.349) 
Retired 0.256  0.246  0.092  0.204  0.091  0.119 
   (0.176)  (0.180)  (0.206)  (0.282)  (0.296)  (0.353) 
Homemaker 0.155  0.172  0.090  -0.110  -0.143  -0.171 
   (0.225)  (0.226)  (0.255)  (0.359)  (0.378)  (0.444) 
Married -0.117  -0.092  -0.210  0.248  0.229  0.226 
   (0.136)  (0.138)  (0.156)  (0.196)  (0.211)  (0.239) 
Student/other 0.317**  0.300**  0.163  -0.239  -0.255  -0.041 
   (0.148)  (0.152)  (0.174)  (0.208)  (0.223)  (0.268) 
Number of observations  780  771  662  780  771  662 
Pseudo-R
2 0.031  0.038  0.096  0.056  0.135  0.199 
  
Notes: See notes to Table 11. Also controls for order of deficit. 
Probit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.   55
Table 15 
Probit model for supporting minimum wage increase 
 
Variable 
Coefficient                               
(Standard Error) 
1                        2                        3 
Self-interest  [.03]  [.08]  [.011] 
Log income     -.22***    -.19**      -.28*** 
   (.08)  (.09)  (.10) 
Ideology/Political     [.000]  [.002] 
Liberal   --  .12  .19 
      (.19)  (.22) 
Conservative   --      -.48***    -.39** 
      (.15)  (.17) 
No thought   --  .10  .10 
      (.17)  (.20) 
Other ideology
b   --  -.09   -.06 
      (.29)  (.32) 
Voted   --  -.03  -.24 
      (.14)  (.17) 
Knowledge     [.34]  [.006] 
K score   --  .004  -.001 
      (.004)  (.004) 
Value of Min. Wage   --   --     -.18*** 
       --  (.06) 
Other opinions        [.002] 
A lot lose jobs   --   --      -1.73*** 
         (.25) 
Some lose jobs   --   --      -.95*** 
        (.13) 
Demographics
a  [.000]  [.000]  [.000] 
Years of education    -.08***  -.09***  -.07** 
   (.02)  (.03)  (.03) 
Age -.002  .001  -.008 
   (.005)  (.005)  (.006) 
Female    .42***  .39***       .47*** 
   (.11)  (.12)  (.13) 
Black     1.18***      1.05***     1.13** 
   (.29)  (.30)  (.46) 
Other race
e .40*    .38  .34 
   (.22)  (.23)  (.26) 
Hispanic .23  .17  .34 
   (.23)  (.24)  (.27) 
Unemployed -.04  -.14  .41 
   (.26)  (.26)  (.31) 
Retired    -.17  -.20  -.02 
   (.20)  (.20)  (.23) 
Homemaker .09  .10  .16 
   (.26)  (.26)  (.30) 
Student/other
f -.14  -0.14    -.37* 
   (.18)  (0.18)  (.21) 
Number of observations  838  823  761 
Log Likelihood   -380  -364  -284 
Pseudo-R
2   .13  .16  .29 
 
See notes to Table 11.   56
Table 16 
Ordered probit model for favoring personal investment accounts 
Variable 
Coefficient                     
(Standard Error) 
1                  2                 3 
Self-interest  [.06]  [.004]  [.003] 
Log income  .15**  .11  .11 
    (.06) (.07) (.07) 
Age .004  -.008  -.009* 
    (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Both Parents Alive  .18  .05  -.04 
    (.12) (.13) (.13) 
Mother  Alive  .06 .03 .05 
    (.14) (.15) (.15) 
Father Alive  .01  -.15  -.14 
    (.20) (.24) (.24) 
SS Major Income Source  -.22*  -.40***  -.36*** 
    (.12) (.13) (.14) 
SS Minor Income Source  -.17*  -.31***  -.30*** 
    (.10) (.11) (.11) 
Ideology/Political    [.000]  [.000] 
Liberal --  -.38***  -.40*** 
     (.15)  (.15) 
Conservative --  .87***  .87*** 
     (.13)  (.13) 
No thought  --  .31**  .34** 
     (.14)  (.14) 
Other ideology
b --  -.12  -.18 
     (.23)  (.24) 
Voted --  .04  .02 
     (.11)  (.11) 
Knowledge    [.35]  [.41] 
K score  --  .003  .002 
     (.003)  (.003) 
Monthly SS Benefit  --  .09  .10 
     (.09)  (.09) 
Other Knowledge      [.36] 
Aware of Bush Proposal  --  --  .13 
     --  (.10) 
Aware of Soc Sec Defecit  --  --  .05 
     --  (.11) 
Demographics
a  [.19]  [.22]  [.38] 
Years of education  .03  .05**  .05** 
    (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Female -.26***  -.15  -.11 
    (.08) (.09) (.10) 
Black  -.16 -.07 -.06 
    (.13) (.16) (.16) 
Other race
e  -.04 -.24 -.25 
    (.15) (.17) (.17) 
Hispanic .15  .34**  .34** 
    (.15) (.17) (.17) 
Unemployed -.05  .07  .03 
    (.18) (.19) (.19) 
Retired  -.10 -.03 -.02 
    (.15) (.17) (.17) 
Homemaker  .18 .14 .12 
    (.18) (.20) (.20) 
Student/other  -.06 -.04 -.06 
    (.13) (.15) (.15) 
Number of observations   862 736 731 
Log Likelihood    -883 -713 -706 
Pseudo-R
2   .03 .10 .10 
See notes to Table 11.    57
Table 17 
How Should the Social Security Deficit Be Reduced? 
 
Variable  Raising Taxes Part of Solution  Cutting Benefits Part of Solution 
    1  2  3 4 5 6 
Self Interest  [0.015]  [0.563]  [0.566]  [0.005]  [0.222]  [0.282] 
Log  income  -0.088  -0.143  -0.121  0.099 0.064 0.072 
    (0.078)  (0.088)  (0.090) (0.073) (0.082) (0.083) 
Age -0.007  -0.003  -0.002  -0.009*  -0.007  -0.007 
    (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Both parents alive  0.093  0.071  0.107  0.229  0.140  0.108 
    (0.153)  (0.165)  (0.170) (0.145) (0.156) (0.159) 
Father  alive  -0.341  -0.027  0.088 -0.350 -0.315 -0.371 
    (0.243)  (0.282)  (0.292) (0.251) (0.276) (0.280) 
Mother alive  0.167  0.117  0.125  0.285*  0.208  0.162 
    (0.176)  (0.182)  (0.184) (0.166) (0.171) (0.173) 
SS major income source  0.477***  0.268  0.322*  0.100  -0.074  -0.063 
    (0.147)  (0.171)  (0.176) (0.137) (0.159) (0.162) 
SS minor income source  0.214*  0.158  0.166  -0.071  -0.086  -0.064 
    (0.119)  (0.133)  (0.135) (0.115) (0.127) (0.128) 
Ideology/Political  ---  [0.122]  [0.196]  ---  [0.485]  [0.465] 
Liberal ---  0.122  0.105  ---  0.188  0.207 
      (0.183)  (0.187)     (0.173)  (0.175) 
Conservative ---  -0.106  -0.115  ---  0.142  0.128 
      (0.155)  (0.159)     (0.149)  (0.152) 
No thought  ---  -0.001  0.001  ---  0.293  0.296* 
      (0.175)  (0.177)     (0.163)  (0.164) 
Other ---  -0.663**  -0.652**  ---  -0.112  -0.102 
      (0.281)  (0.294)     (0.290)  (0.299) 
Voted ---  0.121  0.102  ---  0.090  0.104 
      (0.140)  (0.142)     (0.131)  (0.132) 
Knowledge  ---  [0.066]  [0.054]  ---  [0.100]  [0.093] 
K score  ---  -0.008**  -0.009**  ---  0.001  0.001 
      (0.004)  (0.004)     (0.004)  (0.004) 
Monthly benefits (/100)  ---  0.009  0.007  ---  0.017*  0.017* 
      (0.010)  (0.011)     (0.010)  (0.010) 
Aware of Bush proposal  ---  -0.204  -0.198  ---  -0.252**  -0.265** 
      (0.130)  (0.132)     (0.122)  (0.123) 
Aware of pending Social   ---  0.210  0.233  ---  -0.064  -0.057 
  Security deficit     (0.148)  (0.149)     (0.136)  (0.137) 
Other Opinions  ---  ---  [0.100]  ---  ---  [0.278] 
Taxes too high  ---  ---  -0.252**  ---  ---  0.171 
         (0.118)     ---  (0.110) 
Taxes too low  ---  ---  -0.149  ---  ---  0.191 
         (0.288)     ---  (0.277) 
Demographics  [0.029]  [0.318]  [0.268]  [0.005]  [0.021]  [0.049] 
Years of education  0.036  0.007  0.003  -0.062***  -0.041  -0.035 
    (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.028) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) 
Female 0.269***  0.163  0.155  -0.238**  -0.368***  -0.369*** 
    (0.105)  (0.118)  (0.120) (0.099) (0.113) (0.115) 
Black 0.157  0.168  0.182  0.295*  0.173  0.148 
    (0.169)  (0.211)  (0.212) (0.153) (0.187) (0.188) 
Other  race  -0.038  -0.006  0.091 -0.239 -0.267 -0.248 
    (0.194)  (0.211)  (0.220) (0.185) (0.200) (0.203) 
Hispanic  0.352* 0.277 0.200 0.307* 0.367* 0.360* 
    (0.208)  (0.219)  (0.223) (0.187) (0.197) (0.198) 
Unemployed  0.602**  0.795**  0.821**  -0.077 -0.009 -0.023 
    (0.280)  (0.318)  (0.323) (0.216) (0.226) (0.227) 
Retired  -0.289  -0.100  -0.167 -0.167 -0.046 -0.037 
    (0.186)  (0.206)  (0.210) (0.186) (0.201) (0.204) 
Homemaker  -0.197  -0.247  -0.321 -0.079 -0.117 -0.079 
    (0.229)  (0.240)  (0.244) (0.221) (0.235) (0.239) 
Student/Other  -0.075  -0.074  -0.089 -0.345** -0.375** -0.342** 
    (0.160)  (0.181)  (0.185) (0.151) (0.174) (0.176) 
Number  of  observations  793  676  664 793 676 664 
Pseudo-R
2  0.063  0.069  0.075 0.060 0.065 0.065 
 
Notes: See notes to Table 11.  Probit estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Equation also controls 
for married, cohabitation, widowed, divorced or separated, and order of deficit questions. 
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Table 18 
Probit model for favoring universal health insurance 
Variable 
Coefficient                    
(Standard Error) 
1                           2 
Self-interest  [.000]  [.005] 
Log income  -.42***       -.30*** 
   (.09)  (.10) 
Uninsured     .56***  .35 
   (.20)  (.22) 
Family member uninsured  -.11  -.15 
   (.18)  (.20) 
Ideology/Political     [.000] 
Liberal   --      .58*** 
      (.22) 
Conservative   --      -.77*** 
      (.17) 
No thought   --  .15 
      (.20) 
Other ideology
b   -- 
-.48 
      (.30) 
Voted   --    -40** 
      (.17) 
Knowledge     [.12] 
K score   --  .002 
      (.005) 
Percent uninsured   --   .009** 
       (.005) 
Demographics
a  [.03]  [.17] 
Years of education  -.02   -.01 
   (.03)  (.03) 
Age    .001  .004 
   (.005) (.006) 
Female    .21*  .08 
   (.11)  (.13) 
Black        .62***  .28 
   (.23)  (.25) 
Other race  -.05  -.21 
   (.21)  (.24) 
Hispanic .38*  .23 
   (.23)  (.25) 
Unemployed -.08    -.22 
   (.23)  (.31) 
Retired -.15  -.15 
   (.21)  (.24) 
Homemaker .12  .08 
   (.26)  (.29) 
Student/other .24  0.18 
   (.19)  (0.22) 
Number of observations   761  674 
Likelihood ratio   -356  -287 
Pseudo-R
2   .12  .21 
  





Support for Prescription Drug Insurance in Medicare 
 
Variable 1  2  3 
Self-Interest  [0.524]  [0.453]  [0.240] 
Log income  0.100   0.100   0.107  
   (0.119)  (0.119)  (0.128) 
Age -0.008  -0.007  -0.016* 
   (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Both parents alive  -0.010  0.022  -0.111 
   (0.220)  (0.221)  (0.231) 
Father alive  0.297   0.306   0.083  
   (0.470)  (0.465)  (0.480) 
Mother alive  -0.250  -0.284  -0.350 
   (0.236)  (0.237)  (0.245) 
Ideology/Political  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.023] 
Liberal 1.064***  1.069***  0.766** 
   (0.295)  (0.294)  (0.313) 
Conservative 0.143  0.152  -0.127 
   (0.187)  (0.186)  (0.209) 
No thought  0.312  0.360*  -0.182 
   (0.204)  (0.206)  (0.239) 
Other 1.068**  1.069**  0.640   
   (0.544)  (0.542)  (0.564) 
Voted 0.374**  0.432**  0.192   
   (0.185)  (0.187)  (0.210) 
Knowledge       ---  [0.559]  [0.587] 
K score       ---  0.003   0.005  
        ---  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Believes partly       ---       ---  0.079  
covered already       ---       ---  (0.199) 
Demographics  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Years of education  -0.095***  -0.099***  -0.140*** 
   (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.038) 
Female  0.197   0.236   0.086  
   (0.153)  (0.155)  (0.170) 
Black -0.589**  -0.594**  -0.506 
   (0.231)  (0.232)  (0.261) 
Other race  -0.012  -0.138  -0.260 
   (0.295)  (0.304)  (0.326) 
Hispanic -0.100  -0.027  -0.209 
   (0.293)  (0.301)  (0.322) 
Student/Other 1.056***  1.040***  1.131** 
   (0.386)  (0.383)  (0.517) 
Unemployed -0.130  -0.156  -0.326 
   (0.317)  (0.317)  (0.336) 
Retired  0.009   0.050   0.434  
   (0.257)  (0.260)  (0.286) 
Homemaker -0.015  -0.028  0.270 
   (0.342)  (0.340)  (0.377) 
Married 0.440**  0.398*  0.213   
   (0.221)  (0.220)  (0.243) 
Number of observations  629  626  567 
Pseudo-R
2  0.128   0.133   0.139  
 
Notes: Sample is restricted to those who believe that Medicare did not already cover prescription 
drugs outside of the hospital for Medicare patients. 
Equations also control for order of questions, cohabitation, widowhood, and divorced or separated. 
See notes to Table 11.   
 